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Crossed wires about crossed wires: somatosensation and immunity
to error through misidenti cation
We have many ways of nding out about our bodies and their parts ‘from the inside’ — ways which we
might naturally suppose are ways of knowing about our own bodies only. Gareth Evans lists these as
‘our proprioceptive sense, our sense of balance, of heat and cold, and of pressure’ (Evans , p. ),
but it would be natural to expand our focus to all the ways we have of nding out about our bodies
associated with the somatosensory system: a catch-all term borrowed from the biological sciences given
to the family of senses for the detection of temperature, touch (pressure, uttering or vibrations on
the skin), nociception (pains of di erent kinds including dull, throbbing and sharp), sensations (itches,
tickles), proprioception (perception of limb position through the detection of muscle length/tension
and joint pressure/angle), and kinesthesia (perception of limb movement), among others.
If it is right that somatosensory perception is an epistemic channel that is dedicated to a single ob-
ject — that is, to one’s own body — then judgements made on it basis will boast of a certain kind of
epistemic security. While I could be mistaken about the bodily property that I self-ascribe on its basis
(say, I might mistake an intense itch for a pain), I cannot be mistaken solely in virtue of being wrong
about whose body it is that I thereby know about. is amounts to the thesis that somatosensation is
an epistemic source that issues in self-ascriptive judgments with immunity to error through misidenti-
cation relative to a use of the rst person concept. A rst person judgment, I am F, made on grounds
g is immune to error through misidenti cation relative to the use of the rst person concept I i the
following mistake is not possible: the subject knows by g that something is F, and goes wrong only in
judging that the thing that she thereby knows to be F is herself. e question addressed in this paper
is whether somatosensation is a source of judgments with this kind of immunity.
Why would the thesis that somatosensation is a source of judgments with this modal epistemic
For corresponding characterisations of the somatosensory system in scienti c texts see Byrne and Dafny , § , chap
, H. Autrum , Moller , chap , Schmidt , chaps and , and Nelson .
ere is, of course, an immense literature on how the notion of immunity to error through misidenti cation is to be
formulated, that I will not enter into here. e formulation just given is based on the original modal formulation given by
Shoemaker, with standard amendments of relativisation to grounds and formulation in terms of judgments rather than state-
ments. e formulation covers both sides of Pryor’s wh-/de re divide. (Shoemaker , Pryor ). For a recent collection
that highlights some of the complexities regarding formulations of immunity to error through misidenti cation see Prosser
and Recanati .
property be of interest if it turned out to be true? Claims to immunity to error through misidenti -
cation are normally taken to have a very particular kind of signi cance when attached to rst personal
judgment-kinds. ey show that those judgments are formed on the basis of a form of self-knowledge
through which the subject has a distinctively subjective perspective on herself. If there is no possibility
of a misidenti cation, the idea is, then that is because the judgment’s formation did not proceed via an
identi cation in the rst place. So there can be no question of the subject having apprehended some-
thing in the world under a non- rst-personal mode of presentation and then identifying it, or picking it
out, as ‘me’ (as she would put it)— an identi cation that would have brought with it the corresponding
possibility of amisidenti cation. ese are forms of self-knowledge, rather, through which the subject
is delivered to herself directly as herself, in a distinctively rst personal way.
Most people think that introspection is like this. I couldn’t know by introspection that someone
is getting bored, but go wrong only in having judged on those grounds that that someone is me; if
introspection is a way that I have of knowing that anyone is getting bored, it’s a way of knowing that I
am. Which — given the above — is to say that introspection is plausibly a non-identi cation involving
form of self-knowledge, or a way that I have of knowing about myself as myself.
ere’s much less agreement on what we should say about self-ascriptive judgments based on so-
matosensory perception. In large part, that’s because of the apparent conceivability of so-called crossed
wire cases: thought experiments in which a subject is wired up to another’s body in such a way that she
has experiences as ‘from the inside’ caused by the other body, experiences that are subjectively indistin-
guishable from ordinary episodes of somatosensory perception of her own body. ese cases are used
freely in the literature to show that unlike introspection, somatosensory perception does not issue in
self-ascriptive judgments with immunity to error through misidenti cation; unlike introspective self-
knowledge of mental properties, our somatosensory self-knowledge of bodily properties is not a way
of knowing about ourselves as ourselves. If it turns out that some somatosensory judgments really are
immune to error through misidenti cation relative to uses of the rst person concept, that would be a
signi cant result. Itwould bring bodily self-knowledge alongside introspective access to ourmental lives
as a way of knowing about ourselves as ourselves, and so overturn the historically dominant treatment
of psychological self-knowledge over bodily self-knowledge as somehow a ording us amore robust sub-
jective perspective on ourselves.
is way of putting the signi cance of the immunity to error through misidenti cation of some rst personal judgments
is descended from Wittgenstein’s original division between the use of ‘I’ as object and as subject Wittgenstein , p. .
e other main threat facing the thesis that somatosory judgments are immune to error through misidenti cation comes
from empirical counterexamples, both pathological and clinically induced. For some recent examples of discussions of these
empirical cases see, e.g., Mizumoto and Ishikawa Gallagher , and work by Frederique de Vignemont — de Vi-
gnemont , de Vignemont , de Vignemont . e focus of this paper is on crossed wire cases so I do not discuss
these empirical cases here, but I think that de Vignemont has given a compelling case for thinking that they do not pose a
serious threat to bodily immunity to error through misidenti cation either.
A slightly di erent way of putting the threat from crossed wire cases is to say that even if somatosensation is a source of
ere is a tendency in the literature on immunity to error throughmisidenti cation to give descrip-
tively modest sketches of these crossed wire cases. e central aim of this paper is to show that once the
cases’ details have been lled in, it turns out that they do not constitute counterexamples to the immu-
nity to error through misidenti cation of somatosensory judgments. In the next section I set out two
stipulative assumptions aroundwhich these cases are typically built—what Iwill call the phenomenologi-
cal indistinguishability stipulation and the causal connectedness stipulation. In that section I also identify
two necessary conditions that the designer of a crossed wire case will need to show it tomeet if it is to be
a counterexample to the claimed immunity to error through misidenti cation of somatosensory judg-
ments. e rst is that the judging subject must really have made an error of misidenti cation; I call
this the misidenti catory error condition. e second is that there must be no di erence in epistemic
grounds between the crossed wire judgment and an ordinary somatosensory judgment; I call this the
sameness of grounds condition. Plausibly, designers of crossed wire cases think that the rst two legiti-
mate stipulations are enough, perhaps together with further ancillary assumptions, to secure the latter
two substantive necessary conditions.
In § and § , I show that there is an unbridgeable gap between the stipulative assumptions and each
of the two substantive conditions respectively. ese are independent arguments, and the success of
either one would su ce to undermine the force of crossed wire cases. In § , I say what that force is
supposed to be.
First, though, a note about the limits of the paper. e questionwhether our ordinaryways of know-
ing about our own bodies ‘from the inside’ should be counted as ways of perceiving our bodies has been
an historically live question, and it’s not clear that everyone will be happy to give a single answer for all
cases. It might, for instance, seem less controversial to assume a perceptual model of, say, propriocep-
tion—where there is clearly a fact about whether the property is instantiated that comes apart from the
questionwhether the property seems to the experiencing subject to be instantiated— than of sensations,
for which theremight seem to be no seems/is distinction. And certainly the view that feeling sensations
is a matter of apprehending the instantiation of a mental, rather than a physical, property is more his-
judgments with immunity to error through misidenti cation, crossed wire cases demonstrate the possibility of a faculty of
quasi-somatosensation, that subsumes our faculty of somatosensation, where quasi-somatosensation is neutral on the identity
of the source of the perception and its perceiver. If the faculty grounding our related judgments is quasi-somatosensation—
even if all quasi-somatosensation in this world is ordinary somatosensation—this would be enough to establish an asymmetry
between our knowledge of our bodily properties, and our knowledge of our mental properties, for which there could be no
corresponding quasi-faculty. is way of framing the threat is more familiar from parallel debates in the literature on quasi-
memory; cf. Shoemaker and Evans , § . . In keeping with those debates, quasi-somatosensation would be de ned
by the following three necessary conditions: ( ) subject S has somatosensory impressions of physical event e; ( ) someone
is undergoing e; and ( ) the impressions in ( ) are caused in the right kind of way by e in ( ), where ’in the right kind of
way’ is glossed as a causal connection that is as similar as possible to the causal connection in ol ed in ordinary somatosensation
consistent with the non-identity of the subject undergoing e in ( ) and the subject having impressions of e in ( ). I take it
that my arguments in § will work equally well against this way of putting the threat, if translated into arguments that the
causal connectedness stipulation does not su ce to establish that this ’right kind of way’ condition in ( ) is met. anks to an
anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
torically prevalent than a purely mental account of what it is to feel crossed legs ‘from the inside’. ese
are vexed questions, and not ones that I will not enter into here; that is one of the limits of this paper. I
will assume a uniformly perceptualmodel of somatosensation and its submodalities. Relatedly, I assume
that any somatosensory self-ascription is the self-ascription of a perceived bodily property, rather than
of an introspected mental property. I take it that in assuming a perceptual model of somatosensation,
I am siding with a view that has contemporary currency, even if not historically dominance. A nal
preliminary to note is that although the biological sciences recognise somatosensation as a perceptual
system made up of a cluster of submodalities, I will o en talk — harmlessly I think — as if it were a
single perceptual system. I make ner-grained distinctions where appropriate.
Crossed wire cases
Crossed wire cases are designed to target the claim that a rst person judgment, I am F, made ratio-
nally on the grounds of somatosensation, is such that the following mistake is not possible: the subject
knows by somatosensation that something is F, but has gone wrong only in judging that the thing that
she thereby knows to be F is herself. is is the claim that somatosensory judgments are immune to er-
ror through misidenti cation relative to their rst personal components. What would such cases need
to show in order to be counterexamples to that claim? ey would need to illustrate the following pos-
sibility — that a subject could rationally form a judgment I am F on the grounds of somatosensation,
and know on those grounds that something is F, but be wrong in judging it to be herself that she thereby
knows to be F. ere are at least two (related) necessary conditions here:
Misidenti catory error condition: e subject must know, on the relevant grounds, that something
is F, but be mistaken in judging on those grounds that I am F
Sameness of grounds condition: e grounds for this judgment must be somatosensory perception
ese conditions fall out directly from our formulation of immunity to error throughmisidenti cation,
but it will be helpful to say a word or two about why they are important. I take each in turn.
It would be di cult to exaggerate the importance of themisidenti catory error condition. If crossed
wire cases are to show by counterexample that somatosensory judgments are not immune to errors
through misidenti cation, then they must o er a somatosensory judgment that is in error through
misidenti cation. However the details of the case are lled in, then, the very rst thing the case must
do is establish that the judging subject is making an error of misidenti cation.
See, e.g., Armstrong , Armstrong , Pitcher , O’Shaugnessy (vol , chap ),Martin , Tye Tye
, Bermudez , Dretske , Dretske , Crane , Smith , O’Brien , chap , Schwenkler , de
Vignemont (§ ), Richardson . (See Gallagher and Aydede for recent exceptions; both authors position
themselves against current orthodoxy).
e sameness of grounds condition states that the grounds exploited by the judging subject in these
cases must be somatosensory perception. is is to say that they must be of the very same kind as the
grounds we normally exploit when we form judgments about our bodies by perceiving them ‘from the
inside’. A er all, somatosensation is the faculty we are interested in testing with these cases. If it turned
out that the judging subjects in crossed wire cases made use of epistemic grounds other than somatosen-
sation to form their judgments, then we could no longer use those cases to tell us anything about what
our faculty of somatosensory perception is like.
How do crossed wire cases fare with respect to these two conditions? It’s hard to say. e cases are
o en given somewhat perfunctory descriptions, even by their opponents. By now the idea might be
these are familiar bits of argumentative machinery, and we know well enough how to go about lling
them in. But we nd the same descriptive austerity in early examples — take, for instance, Evans’ brisk
introduction of them as:
the possibility of a deviant causal chain, linking the subject’s brain appropriately with someone
else’s body, in such a way that he is in fact registering information from that other body. (Evans
, p. )
Or Armstrong’s description of the relevant cases as those in which we:
become aware e.g. of another’s limbs, in much the same sort of way that we become aware of the
motion of our own limbs (Armstrong , p. )
Or to give a more recent example, in the context of a discussion about whether a complete account
of immunity to error through misidenti cation should rule out identi cation-involving background
presuppositions, Wright states that:
in bizarre but possible background circumstances Imay need to have information that I am not, to-
day, being smitten with proprioceptive experiences originating from someone else’s body. (Wright
, p. )
ere’s nothing atypically descriptively ascetic about these examples.
It wouldn’t do to simply stipulate that the above two conditions, misidenti catory error condition
and sameness of grounds condition, are met in these thinly described scenarios — we would have no
way of telling whether those stipulations served to carve out a genuine metaphysical possibility. Indeed,
we might just as well simply stipulate that the possibility ruled out by the claim that somatosensory
judgments are immune to error throughmisidenti cation relative to uses of the rst person concept isn’t
ruled out. If we are to show that crossed wire cases really do amount to illuminating counterexamples
to that claim then we will need to ll in some of their details.
For more examples of recent crossed wire cases see, e.g., Cassam , p. , Coliva , p. , O’Brien , p. ,
Chen , p. , deVignemont , p. , Prosser , p. , Guillot , n. , García-Carpintero forthcoming, pp. -
ere are some elements of these cases that we can take for granted. It is a xed feature of these
cases, for instance, that the judging subject forms her judgment on the basis of an experience that has
been caused by states of, or events happening in, a body distinct from the subject’s own. Let’s call this
the causal connectedness stipulation. Without the causal connectedness stipulation it would be an open
possibility that the experience was caused in the normal way by states of and events in the subject’s own
body. ere could then be no chance of a misidenti cation error arising.
Another xed feature is that the judging subject’s experience must be phenomenologically indistin-
guishable from an ordinary episode of somatosensory perception. is is the phenomenological indistin-
guishability stipulation, and it is motivated in at least two ways. e rst is that it is needed to secure
the rationality of the subject’s self-attribution of the experienced bodily property. For it is clear that
if the judging subject’s experience of the other body was noticeably di erent from her ordinary experi-
ence of her own body, then she would be able to simply read o from the phenomenological content
of the experience whether it was the other body or her own that was featuring in her experience. She
would then have no reason to form a rst person judgment on the grounds of a crossed wire experience,
because it would be phenomenologically salient to her that it was not her body in question. Of course,
to be a counterexample to the claimed immunity to error through misidenti cation of somatosensory
judgments, the subject must form a rst person judgment — one that is in error through misidenti -
cation relative to its rst personal component. But without the phenomenological indistinguishability
stipulation in place, wewould have to put the formation of this judgment down to a failure of rationality.
e subject’s judgment would then be so disconnected from its purported grounds that wewould could
no longer hope to learn anything about those grounds by looking to that judgment. e second reason
to stipulate phenomenological indistinguishability is because without it, it’s hard to see how the case
could have any hope of meeting the sameness of grounds condition. Whether or not phenomenological
indistinguishability is su cient for sameness of grounds, it is at least surely necessary.
Here is a crossed wire case with these stipulated features.
Basic Case: Annhas been kidnapped. Unbeknownst to her, her kidnappers havewired her up using
a complicated system of cables to another of their kidnap victims, Bob. While they are hooked up
in this way, Bob has a tickle in his nose that causes Ann to have an experience on the basis of which
she rationally judges there’s a tickle in my nose.
e idea is as follows. Ann’s rst person judgment there’s a tickle in my nose is formed on the basis of
somatosensory perception. Unlike our ordinary somatosensory judgments, however, it seems that Ann
has misidenti ed her judgment’s object; it’s really Bob’s nose and not hers that is ticklish, and that she
knows on those grounds to be so. So Ann demonstrates the possibility of a rst person somatosen-
sory judgment that is in error through misidenti cation relative to its rst person component — she
knows, on the grounds of somatosensory perception, that someone’s nose is ticklish, but makes the mis-
take only of judging it to be hers. Put another way, the idea is that the described scenario in Basic Case,
together with a few further plausible ancillary assumptions, is enough to secure the above two necessary
conditions on being a counterexample to the claim that somatosensory judgments are immune to error
through misidenti cation: Ann has committed a misidenti catory error (misidenti catory error condi-
tion), and she has done so on the basis of somatosensory perception (sameness of grounds condition).
In the rest of this paper I argue that this is to overestimate the force ofBasicCase. ere is no harm in
describing a scenario that meets both the causal connectedness and phenomenological indistinguishability
stipulations, as I have done in Basic Case—there is nothing obviously conceptually problematic about a
case so described. e problem for proponents of crossed wire cases, however, is that such descriptions
don’t su ce to establish that either of the above two substantive conditions are met. In the next section
I show why we cannot legitimately move from the facts described in Basic Case to the claim that the
misidenti catory error condition is met, and in § I do likewise for the sameness of grounds condition.
Designers of crossed wire cases cannot simply stipulate that these conditions are met, but neither can
they show that they follow from the stipulations that they are allowed to help themselves to.
Meeting themisidenti catory error condition
emisidenti catory error condition says that the subjectmust knowon the relevant grounds that some-
thing is F, but be mistaken in judging on those grounds that she herself is. As we saw above, showing
that there can be an error of this kind made on the basis of somatosensory perception is the primary
task of crossed wire cases. If it is to be a substantive result, however, then designers of crossed wire cases
cannot simply stipulate that their described cases involve errors of this kind. Rather, they must show
that the presence of such an error is implied by the conceptually unproblematic assumptions about the
case as captured by Basic Case above.
One reason to think that designers of crossed wire cases are on a strong footing here is because we
have already seen that they can help themselves to the causal connectedness stipulation; it’s written into
these cases from the start that the experience that grounds the subject’s judgment is caused by states
and events happening in someone else’s body. It might seem like a small step from here to the claim
that on the basis of that experience, the subject knows that someone is instantiating a particular bodily
property, but has made a mistake in judging it to be herself. at’s because the causal connectedness
stipulation might seem to be enough to secure the claim that the experiencing subject is perceiving the
other body, rather than her own. And if that’s right, then it also seems right to say that she will have
made a misidenti catory error if she goes on to self-ascribe the bodily property that she thereby knows
about. I have no objection to this last claim—if Ann really is perceiving Bob’s body, then in forming a
rst person judgment on those grounds she has committed an error of misidenti cation. In this section,
however, I argue that the precedingmove from causal connectedness to genuine perception amounts to
a much bigger step than it might at rst seem. And it’s not one that I think the crossed wire designer
can take without falling back to brute stipulation.
To see why this is, it will be helpful to say a bit more about what Ann’s experience in Basic Case
must be like. Her experience is surely as of a single body-space. is is crucial, since any proliferation
of experienced body-spaces ‘from the inside’ would alert Ann to the unusualness of her situation, such
that it would be rational for her to withhold from making any rst person judgments on the basis of
those experiences until she nds out more about what is going on. For the same reason, let’s add that
the nose is experienced as bearing all the same spatial relations to other felt body-parts and to felt bodily
boundaries as in an ordinary episode of somatosensory perception — these details are all mandated by
the phenomenological indistinguishability stipulation. For good measure, let’s put her in the dark and
immobilise her, so as to avoid calibration through vision or action-knowledge that might interfere with
her formation of the rst person judgment.
Does the phenomenological indistinguishability stipulation also mandate that Ann’s experience has
de se content, that it is as of my nose (as Ann would put it) rather than as of a nose? I think it does.
To see why, suppose that it doesn’t. Suppose that Ann’s experience is itself neutral about whose nose
the experience is of; the content of the experience is tickle in a nose, or perhaps simply nose-tickle! e
idea must then be that Ann’s transition from this person-neutral content to a rst person judgment is
rationally motivated by something additional to the experience’s content, perhaps by a kind of habitual
toggling between experiences gained in that way and uses of the rst person concept. Here’s a reason
to think that this description of the experience won’t do.
e problem with allowing that Ann’s experience could be person-neutral begins by noticing that
somatosensation is unlike a distal sense like vision insofar as there is no privileged position on the body
counting as its perceptual point of origin; somatosensation is a non-perspectival sense modality. is is
not a new idea. J.L. Bermudez, for example, explains:
[ ere is] a fundamental disanalogy between the bodily space of proprioception and the egocentric
space of perception [...]. In the case of vision [...] there is a perceptual eld bounded in a way that
determines a particular point as its origin. [...] But our knowledge of our own bodies is not like
this at all. It is not clear what possible reason there could be for o ering one part of the body as the
origin of the proprioceptive frame of reference. (Bermudez , p. )
When I look down and see my ankle, I see it as located at a certain distance and angle along an axis orig-
is way of seeing things has connections with what François Recanati might have in mind when he describes proprio-
ceptive experiences having thetic content, and the rationality of the transition to a rst person judgment being supplied by
the experience’s ‘mode’ — something akin to attitudinal force. (See, e.g., Recanati , Recanati , Recanati ). It’s
not clear, however, how deep the disagreement is between this part of Recanati’s picture and my concluding claim in this ar-
gument, which is that Ann’s experience cannot be neutral as to whose body she is perceiving. at claim is compatible with
the idea that the rst personal aspect of the experience is contributed by its mode. e imagined opponent here is someone
who thinks that bodily awareness could fail to have a rst personal aspect at all — cf., e.g., O’Brien , pp. - .
Bermudez’s claim is about proprioception, but I take the observation to generalise across all the senses involved in the so-
matosensory system (other than bodily feelings; see fn. ). For other recent discussions on this point see Smith , Soteriou
, and Gallagher .
inating from my eyes. When I feel a pain in my ankle, by contrast, there is no centralised physiological
mechanism analogous to the optic system from which the pain is perceived. More generally, there is
no signi cant point of origin from which somatosensory perceptions are had. e internal body-space
itself constitutes a region that is both perceivable, and from which internal bodily perceptions are had:
the body and its parts are both object and organ of somatosensation. As Bermudez points out, support
for this claim comes from noticing that it makes little sense to ask of two somatosensorily perceived
objects, which of these objects is further away? Or, do they both lie in the same direction? e reason
for this, he explains, is because these questions both implicitly assume an origin-centred structure; ‘[t]he
conclusion to draw from this is that the spatial content of somatic proprioception cannot be speci ed
within a frame of reference that takes the form of axes centered on an origin.’ (Bermudez , p. )
is structural di erence between vision and somatosensation is hardly surprising given the anatom-
ical di erences between the physical systems that sustain them. In the case of vision, several million
photoreceptors are gathered on the retina to absorb incoming light particles from outside the eye. By
contrast, the somatosensory system is comprised of receptors distributed with di ering concentrations
throughout the body, over muscles, bones, skin, epithelial and connective tissues and internal organs,
which harvest information from thes body parts in which they are located. Our sensitivity to mus-
cle stretch, for instance, is due to muscle spindles, or small encapsulated sensory receptors, positioned
throughout each of our muscles in varying levels of density that serve to detect any changes in the state
of the muscle’s extension. e body-part serves at once as perceptual object and organ. No wonder,
then, the non-perspectival structure of somatosensation.
If Ann’s experience is to be phenomenologically indistinguishable from an ordinary episode of so-
matosensory perception, then it must be indistinguishable for her from an experience gained through
the exercise of a non-perspectivally structured perceptual modality. But if that’s right, then her expe-
rience cannot remain neutral about whose body it is. If a single body-space appears to her to be both
the body-space perceived and the position from which the perceiving is done, then the perceived body-
space must seem to her to be that of the perceiving subject. It’s hard to see how we could hold to that
requirement without also granting her experience de se content; she cannot experience a body-space as
belonging to the subject of that very experience without experiencing it as belonging to her. e experi-
ence must be, as Ann would put it, as of my nose being ticklish. I don’t think there is anything in this
that the crossed wire designer need take objection to.
Here are the facts on the ground as we currently have them regarding Basic Case. We know that an
I take up the question whether it must in fact be non-perspectivally structured later.
is argument makes contact with, but does not take a stand on, the debate on the sense of ownership. All the main
participants in that debate agree that we experience our bodies as ours; their dispute is centred on the question whether or
not this is to be understood as a special positive ownership quale. (See, e.g., Bermúdez , de Vignemont , Martin
.) In this argument I undertake a commitment to the starting ownership datum, that through somatosensory perception
we experience our bodies as our own, but not to any particular account of it.
event happening in the region of Bob’s nose causes Ann to have a de se experience of her nose being tick-
lish. We know that this experience is phenomenologically indistinguishable for Ann from an ordinary
episode of somatosensory perception. We certainly know that on the basis of this experience Ann goes
on to form the rst person judgment, there’s a tickle in my nose, and we assume that this transition was
a rational one. Do these facts su ce to establish that Ann is really somatosensorily perceiving a tickle
in Bob’s nose, and so that her judgment is in error through misidenti cation relative to its rst personal
component? ey don’t. at’s because these facts on the ground don’t yet give us any reason not to
take Ann’s report of a de se experience at face value.
e problem for the designer of the crossedwire case here is that the details of the case as sanctioned
by our two legitimate starting stipulations do nothing to rule out the possibility that this really is an
ordinary self-directed episode of somatosensory perception that Ann has of her own nose, albeit one
with an unusual causal history. e sensation would admittedly be very unlike many of her ordinary
sensations, insofar as its recent causal history can be traced back via an event happening in Bob’s body.
But we don’t yet have any reason to grant the sensation in Bob’s nose any more elevated a status than we
give to other causal antecedents ofAnn’s experience in the crossedwire case—theprior event of a feather
brushing Bob’s nose, say, or the movements of the kidnapper’s feather-clasping hand in its approach to
Bob’s nose — or that we give to the ordinary causal antecedents of her ordinary sensations. We are
certainly not forced by the details of Basic Case to say that Ann and Bob are both using somatosensory
perception as away of nding out about a single event happening inBob’s nose at the same time; that like
for Bob, it is Bob’s nose that features directly in Ann’s somatosensory experience. Rather, given the de se
content of her experience, a much more likely description of the case is that the tickle in Bob’s nose has
caused Ann to have a coordinate sensation of ticklishness in her own nose — the experiment’s wiring
system is, to borrow a line from Martin, ‘nothing more than a sophisticated mechanism for causing
[tickles] in two people instead of one’ (Martin , p. ). ere would be nomystery on this reading
of the case about the experience’s phenomenological likeness to an ordinary episode of somatosensation.
Ann really is engaged in an ordinary episode of somatosensation. It’s just that it was brought about in
rather an unusual way.
It won’t help the crossedwire case designer here to add the detail that Ann experiences the sensation
as being located at the objective spatial coordinates currently occupied by Bob’s nose — to build into
the case, for example, that she would point to Bob’s nose if asked where tickles. It’s not that there need
be a con ict here with the phenomenological indistinguishability stipulation. Even if the experience is a
bit strange, the designer could still rightfully insist that the experience will be phenomenologically in-
is argument does not rely on any controversial assumptions about the metaphysics of bodily ownership; the claim
is merely that Ann might be perceiving the very nose that she would ordinarily perceive in a non-crossed wire episode of
somatosensation — viz., the object that biology would recognise as her own nose. In particular, it does not rely on anything
like what Quassim Cassam calls the Lockean view of bodily ownership, on which one’s body is constituted of the body in
which it is possible for one to feel sensations Cassam , pp. - . anks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
distinguishable from an ordinary episode of somatosensory perception. It will just be indistinguishable
from an episode of somatosensory perception in which the subject is su ering from an illusion about
her body’s shape, size or position. e problem, rather, is that nothing in this reading of the case rules
out that Ann is having an (illusory) experience of her own nose, within the the context of an (illusory)
experience of her own body-space. e wiring system is now not only a sophisticated mechanism for
producing tickles in two people instead of one, but also of producing elaborate illusions in one of those
subjects with respect to their bodily dimensions. In other words, when Ann says that she is experienc-
ing a tickle in her nose, we don’t yet have any reason not to take that report of a self-(mis)perception
seriously. None of the ways of reading the case considered so far gives us any reason to think that Ann
has made an error of misidenti cation in her rst person judgment there is a tickle in my nose.
e crossed wire proponent needs to give us reason to reject these readings, and to instead see the
causal connection between Ann’s experience and Bob’s nose-tickle as constituting a genuine perceptual
link—one that will underwrite amisidenti catory error onAnn’s part, and so ensure that themisidenti-
catory error condition ismet. Here’s one thing she could try. She could invite us to thinkmore carefully
about the envisaged wiring mechanism linking Ann to Bob. One way it might work is by stimulating
nerve endings in the perceiving subject’s relevant body-part; in this case, Ann’s nose. Quite right, the de-
signer might allow, that if this is how we are imagining the case then we must think of Bob’s nose-tickle
as causing an independent sensation of ticklishness in Ann’s. But here’s another way it might work: by
arti cial stimulation of the relevant areas of the perceiving subject’s brain. ( is set-up is suggested,
for instance, by Evans’s earlier description of the case). It’s much less obvious on this way of arranging
things that Ann is still (mis)perceiving her own nose. A er all, we now have amechanism before us that
produces sensory experiences in Ann that reliably track how things are with Bob, that doesn’t work by
stimulating her own body-parts. Isn’t this enough to count as perceiving Bob’s body?
e crossed wire designer ought, I think, to be cautious in taking up this suggestion. She will have
to be prepared to argue that all we need for genuine perception is a mechanism that tracks how things
are in some region of space through the production of sensory experiences. is is an extremely thin
notion of perception, and one we would need good reasons to accept. And for fear of question-begging,
those reasons would have to have nothing to do with crossed wire cases.
Consider the following scenario that seems to tell against such a notion. Suppose there is an apple
on the table in the next room, far out of range of my normal sight. e apple is tted with a scanning
device, attached by a long wire to my visual cortex. Immediately in front of me is a colourful fruit-bowl
containing oranges and bananas, but no apples. On the ick of a switch the apple is scanned, and the
device sends signals tomyvisual cortex that causeme tohave an experience subjectively indistinguishable
from a visual perception of an apple among the other fruit in the bowl. Am I seeing the apple in the next
room?
Not, I take it, in any normal sense of ‘see’. e apple certainly plays a lead role in the causal his-
tory of my experience. But it is not causally connected to the production of that experience in the way
characteristic of the objects of ordinary visual perceptions. Maybe— if it was independently important
to us — we could nd a way to hold on to a description of the case as one of ‘seeing’ the apple, with
enough semantic stretching of the term. But once the subject’s eyes are taken out of the causal picture,
and the experience is proximately caused by poking around in the subject’s brain, the case is much more
comfortably described as a neurologically induced visual hallucination, even if it is an hallucination that
reliably tracks how things are with the apple next door.
LikewisewithAnn’s case. Let’s suppose that instead of being caused by bodily stimulation, where the
body and it’s parts serve as both object and organ of perception in the normal way, Ann’s experience is
caused by arti cial manipulation of her somatosensory cortex. Let’s suppose, moreover, that the precise
patterning of the prodding in Ann’s brain is determined by events happening in Bob’s body in such
a way that the somatosensorily experienced body-space is spatiotemporally isomorphic to Bob’s actual
body-space. Is this a way for Ann to somatosensorily perceive Bob’s nose? Perhaps there will be a way to
argue that it is, if we had somemotivation independent from our intuitions about crossed wire cases for
stretching what we mean by ‘somatosensory perception’ this far. But absent such motivation, the case is
much more comfortably described as a neurologically induced somatosensory hallucination, even if it
is one that reliably maps on to states and events happening in Bob’s body-space. And we certainly have
no principled reason to rule that reading out. Ann’s judgment is now in error for sure, but for all that
the case has established so far, not in virtue of a misidenti cation.
Howwould things look ifwe changed the self-ascribed property to a proprioceived property? What
if, for instance, keeping all other details xed in Basic Case, Ann judges not there’s a tickle in my nose but
my arm is bent? Proprioception, understood as the sense of static limb position, is a submodality of
somatosensation that is itself a multicomponential sensory system. For the most part, impulses from
various types of peripheral receptors in the skin, muscles and joints in the subject’s limbs and trunk
are carried through the spinal cord to the brainstem, where they cross over to the contralateral cerebral
cortex. is means that whenAnn judges thatmy arm is bent in an ordinary case of somasensation, that
judgment is based on the synthesis of information coming into her cerebral cortex from a collection of
di erent local nervous systems. Suppose now that the wiring system in Basic Caseworks by connecting
body-part to body-part. In that case, what we are imagining is that the impulses coming from a cluster
of di erent receptors in Bob’s arm (skin, muscles, joints) are diverted — or perhaps, branched — into
the arti cial wires so as to stimulate the exactly matching receptors in Ann’s arm, in such a way that they
send information up the relevant pathways to her sensory cortex that lead to a conscious personal-level
experience on the basis of which she forms the rst person judgment, my arm is bent. Even if Ann’s
is does not rule out the possibility that the sensations caused by thewiring systemwill end up contributing to awayAnn
has of knowing about Bob’s body; e.g. an inferential knowledge-source involving both Ann’s sensations and her testimonial
knowledge of a reliable correspondence between those sensations and how things are in Bob’s body. But this would be to shi
Ann’s epistemic grounds, and so to violate the sameness of grounds condition.
experience is caused in rather an unusual way, so long as these receptor-stimulations in her arm send the
relevant information through Ann’s peripheral nerves into her spinal cord and into the relevant cortical
areas ofAnn’s brain, it’s hard to see how else to understand it than as a proprioceptive (mis)perception of
her own arm. at’s so even if the causal deviancy of the events leading up to that (mis)perception leads
her to misrepresent the arm’s position. Ann’s judgment is in error, but not through a misidenti cation.
Suppose now that instead of linking body-part to body-part, the wires function by connecting Bob’s
arm to Ann’s cerebral cortex. e patterns of impulses in the receptors distributed throughout Bob’s
le arm now cause signals to be sent up the attached wires, and in turn to cause Ann’s cerebral cortex to
be stimulated to generate precisely the same patterns of activation that would result from an ordinary
proprioceptive perception of her own arm being bent. Ann has a person-level conscious experience as
of her own arm being bent, and goes on to form the rst person judgment,my arm is bent.
If this second version of the set-up is to satisfy the misidenti catory error condition, then we must
show that it su ces for genuine perception of Bob’s arm, on the basis ofwhichAnnknows that someone’s
arm is bent but is wrong only in judging it to be her own arm that is. To do that, we must insist that
the role that Bob’s arm plays in causing Ann’s experience is enough to elevate it to the status of her
object of perception. But why should we allow this causal antecedent of Ann’s experience any more
privileged a status than any other? To bring the point out, consider the following variation of the case.
Suppose now that instead of connecting Bob’s arm directly to Ann’s brain, her kidnappers connect it to
a computer that calculates the precise areas of the brain thatwould be activated by his arm-bend. One of
the kidnappers, an apprentice neuroscientist, nowuses this information tomanually stimulate those very
areas of Ann’s brain. Ann has a personal-level conscious experience as of her arm being bent, and goes
on to form a rst person judgment about it. Clearly, Ann does not thereby perceive the neuroscientist-
kidnapper, even if he is the proximate cause of those patterns of brain activation; mere causation does
not su ce for perception. Rather, Ann now has a neurologically induced hallucination as of her own
le arm being bent. e only di erence between this scenario and our previous crossed wire case is
that her patterns of brain activation were before being caused by signals delivered by wires connected to
Bob’s arm, rather than by signals delivered directly into her brain by the neuroscentist-kidnapper. Is this
di erence reason enough to treat these two cases di erently with respect to the question whether Ann
is having a neurologically induced hallucination? Once Ann’s brain activation is caused by anything
other than impulses carried through the ordinary spinal pathways from her peripheral nerves, it seems
muchmore natural to treat the activation in both of these variations of the case as something other than
genuine perception. ere is no misidenti catory error on this second set up of the case, not because
Ann is right about who she has perceptual knowledge of, but because on this version of the case Ann
does not have perceptual knowledge of anything at all.
Even adding these supplementary details about the functioning of the wiring system to the starting
stipulations in Basic Case, then, those stipulations are not enough to establish that themisidenti catory
error condition is met. In the next section I will argue that they are not enough to secure the sameness of
grounds condition either. Of course, thedesigner could simply add as a brute detail of the case that on the
grounds of her somatosensory perceptual episode, Ann knows that something is F, but makes a mistake
in judging it to be herself. But the case would then have only as much force as the bare stipulation that
somatosensory bodily self-ascriptions are vulnerable to error through misidenti cation relative to their
rst personal components.
I turn now to the sameness of grounds condition.
Meeting the sameness of grounds condition
e sameness of grounds condition says that the grounds on which Ann’s misidenti catory error occurs
must be somatosensory perception, grounds of the very same kind as those we ordinarily exploit in our
somatosensory judgments. Again, if these cases are to be e ective, then their designers cannot simply
stipulate that this condition is met. ey must show that it is implied by the details of Basic Case. One
way the designer might try to reach this result is by appeal to the starting phenomenological indistin-
guishability stipulation. According to this stipulation, Ann’s crossed wire experience is phenomenologi-
cally indistinguishable from an ordinary episode of somatosensation. So as long as we are happy to slice
epistemic grounds only as nely as their phenomenological content, this will be enough to secure the
claim that Ann is undergoing an episode of somatosensation. It takes very little, on this way of putting
things, to move from the phenomenological indistinguishability stipulation to meeting the sameness of
grounds condition. In this section I will suggest that we, and the crossed wire designers themselves, have
reason not to make that move.
To meet the phenomenological indistinguishability stipulation, Ann’s crossed wire experience must
be phenomenologically indistinguishable from an ordinary episode of somatosensation. We saw earlier
that one of the distinctive features of ordinary somatosensation is its non-perspectival structure. ere
is normally no distance between the position perceived through somatosensation and the position from
which it is perceived; the body and its parts serve as both object and organ of perception. To meet the
phenomenological indistinguishability stipulation, then, Ann’s experience must be indiscriminable from
a non-perspectivally structured perceptual episode. But notice that even if we grant that her experience
is phenomenologically indistinguishable from a perceptual episode had through a non-perspectival per-
ceptual faculty, and grant (contra the last section) that she really is perceiving Bob’s nose, her perception
cannot actually be non-perspectivally structured.
Why not? Well, ex hypothesi Ann’s experience is caused by states of, and events happening in an-
other’s body. at much is mandated by the causal connectedness stipulation. We saw in the last section
that if the crossed wire case is to be e ective, its designer must nd a way to convince us that this causal
connection constitutes a genuine perceptual link. Suppose she succeeds in doing this. It will then be an
important part of the argued case that Ann is remotely perceiving Bob’s body. Which means that it will
an important part of the argued case that the perceptual point of origin — which must surely be with
Ann, the perceiving subject — is at a distance from the body-part being perceived. And, of course, this
is just what it is to be perspectivally structured. e same point can also be put another way: a crossed
wire experience could not become non-perspectivally structured without a corresponding shi in per-
ceiver. at’s because only Bob can actually perceive his own body from the inside at no distance, since
only Bob is co-located with the perceived body-space. So we could not insist that the perceptual state is
in fact non-perspectival without restoring Bob, and not Ann, as perceiver.
So unlike ordinary episodes of somatosensation, Ann’s perceptual state is perspectivally structured
— though in keeping with the phenomenological indistinguishability stipulation this structural feature
of the episode is screened o fromAnn herself. By itself, this needn’t undermine the sameness of grounds
condition. A er all, asMartin points out, ‘we do not tend to think that the use of spectacles, or even the
use of binoculars or telescopes, prevents us from genuinely seeing objects through them’ (Martin ,
p. ). Why think that a prosthetic device extending the range of somatosensation beyond its normal
scope will prevent a subject from enjoying a state of genuine somatosensory perception, of the very
same kind as she ordinarily has of her own body? ere is no immediate inconsistency in accepting the
perspectival di erence between ordinary somatosensory episodes and crossed wire experiences, while at
the same time holding that they are di erent exercises of the same perceptual faculty. How, then, should
we settle the question whether these are grounds of the same kind?
It’s hard to know how to non-stipulatively resolve individuation questions for epistemic grounds,
and it’s not clear that there will be any good general answers to that question that aren’t relativised to
particular purposes for asking it. In this case, however, we have reason to think that crossed wire design-
ers themselves should treat the di erence just raised between crossed wire experiences and somatosensa-
tion as a di erence that matters. at’s because the di erence between somatosensory perception and
crossed wire episodes is not like the di erence between ordinary vision and looking through a telescope.
It involves structural distortion rather thanmere extension in range. And for the purposes of the present
discussion, this gives us reason to agree that the judgmental grounds that they respectively provide are
distinct.
Here’s why. e issue standing between defenders of the immunity to error through misidenti -
cation of somatosensory judgments and designers of crossed wire cases is whether judgments based on
somatosensation involve an identi cation, or a picking out, of the somatosensorily perceived body as
oneself. But these are structural features of the judgment rather than features of scope, structural fea-
tures that re ect certain architectural facts about the grounds on which they were formed. e only
way that a perceptual judgment could be formed in a way that involves an identi cation of an object as
oneself is if the perceptual faculty by which the judgment is formed assumes a separation between the
perceiving subject and the subject perceived. Only then could the faculty work by the perceiving sub-
ject identifying, or picking out, the perceived object. Indeed, it’s not even clear that we can really make
sense of talk of ‘identi cation’, or ‘picking out’, of a perceptual object in the absence of such a separation.
If that’s right then there is no question of a judgment formed on the basis of a faculty that lacks such a
separation involving an identi cation of the apprehended perceptual object; the faculty’s architecture
simply does not permit of judgments structured in this way.
All of this is to say thatwe should expect that a di erence in the perspectival structure of a perceptual
faculty will correspond to a di erence in the identi cation-involvement of a judgmentmade on its basis,
even if a di erence in scope will not. So if somatosensation and crossed wire experiences di er with
respect to their perspectival structure, then we should expect them to di er too with respect to whether
judgments formed on their basis are identi cation-involving. Now all parties to the present dispute
are interested in the question of grounds-individuation in the service of revealing whether the grounds
underlying our ordinary somatosensory judgments involve any such identi cation. (Our somatosensory
judgments are identi cation-involving, so the crossed wire argument goes, because they are made on
the same grounds as crossed wire cases, and crossed wire judgments are identi cation-involving.) So
if there are di erences in the faculties underlying our somatosensory and our crossed wire judgments
that predict di erences in the identi cation-involvement of those judgments, then all parties should
agree to treat these as grounds of di erent kinds, given the question at hand. However the crossed
wire proponent individuates her grounds, her reasons for individuating them in the rst place requires
that her individuative principle be sensitive to these structural di erences even if it is not sensitive to
di erences in scope. e crossed wire designer, then, need not count an arti cial extension in range
(glasses, telescopes, etc.) as an acceptable reason to plea di erence in grounds. But she cannot say the
same of an arti cially induced structural distortion like the one involved in crossed wire cases.
ere is nothing in this argument that depends on the choice of judgment inBasic Case. To see this,
take again Ann’s proprioceptive judgment, my arm is bent. Like ordinary somatosensory perceptions
of tickles, ordinary proprioceptive perceptions of arm-bends are non-perspectivally structured; there
is normally no distance between the point om which and at which the arm-bend is perceived. Now,
even if — contra the arguments of § — the crossed wire designer found a way to argue that Ann really
is perceiving Bob’s body, Ann’s perception of Bob’s bent arm cannot likewise be non-perspectival in
structure. at’s because by the designer’s own lights, it is part of the argued case that Ann is using the
crossed wire perception to perceive a body-part distinct from her own body. ere could otherwise be
no error of misidenti cation. But in that case there must be some distance between the perceived arm
ere is also a second reason to treat the grounds underlying ordinary somatosensory judgments and those underlying
crossed wire judgments as distinct, but one that risks only speaking to those with a prior taste for disjunctivist accounts of
perceptual experience. at is, that given that the non-perspectival structure of crossedwire episodesmust be screened o from
the experiencing subject, there will be a robust and systematic di erence in the veridicality of the kinds of states grounding the
two sorts of judgments: one, but not the other, is systematically illusory. is may be enough for some theorists for a rejection
of the claim that they are states of the same fundamental kind.
(located in Bob’s body) and the position from which the perceiving is done (which must be in Ann’s
body, if Ann is to be counted as the perceiver.)
is di erence, I have argued, is di erence enough to block claims to meeting the sameness of
grounds condition. at’s because a di erence like this in the architecture of the perceptual faculty
underlying a proprioceptive judgment in the ordinary case and Ann’s judgment in the crossed wire case
gives rise to a predictable di erence inwhether those judgmentswill be identi cation-involving. But the
only reason we are engaged in the task of individuating grounds is because we are ultimately interested
in the identi cation-involvement of judgments formed on their basis — it is only because they take the
grounds underlyingAnn’s crossedwire judgment and ordinary proprioceptive judgments to be the same
that crossedwire proponents are permitted to extrapolate from the identi cation-involvement of one of
those judgment-kinds to the other. But if this is the reason why the question of grounds-individuation
has arisen, then we and the crossed wire designers have a shared reason to treat the di erence between a
perspectival and a non-perspectival perceptual faculty providing such grounds as a di erence that mat-
ters. Even by the lights of their own individuative principles the sameness of grounds condition cannot
be met.
Without meeting the sameness of grounds condition, crossed wire cases lose their force. ey no
longer tell us anything about what our faculty of somatosensation is like. At most, what they tell us is
that there is a conceptually possible sensory modality through which we perceive others’ bodies ‘from
the inside’. is modality would be a lot like somatosensory perception inmanyways, except that unlike
somatosensation, it would be a way of knowing about the instantiation of bodily properties that can be
targeted at many objects in the world rather than just one. And corollatively, unlike somatosensation,
any rst person judgments about those properties formed on that basis would be vulnerable to errors of
misidenti cation relative to their rst personal components.
Conclusion
e arguments of § revealed a gap between the stipulations allowed intoBasic Case and themisidenti -
catory error condition that cannot be bridged without falling back to brute stipulation. e arguments
of § showed a similar gap between those stipulations and the sameness of grounds condition that should
not be bridged even by the crossedwire designers’ own lights. But those two conditionsmust be satis ed
if crossed wire cases are to be counterexamples to the claim that somatosensory judgments are immune
to error throughmisidenti cation relative to uses of the rst person concept, and their satisfactionmust
be shown to follow from legitimate starting assumptions rather than by mere stipulation. So we do not
yet have any reason to think that there are any genuine counterexamples to that claim in the form of
crossed wire cases.
e descriptive levity withwhich these cases are usually o ered is surely intended by their authors as
nothing more than a harmless argumentative shortcut. If nothing else I hope I have raised some doubts
about how harmless this shortcut really is. At the very least, we should await more careful ngerwork
in lling in the details of these cases before using them to downgrade our bodily self-knowledge from
its status alongside introspection as a way of knowing about ourselves as oursel es.
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